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Abstract
Large law ﬁrms seem to prefer hourly fees over contingent fees.
This paper provides a moral hazard explanation for this pattern of
behavior. Contingent legal fees align the interests of the attorney with
those of the client, but not necessarily with those of the partnership.
We show that the choice of hourly fees is a solution to an agency
problem with multiple principals, where the interests of one principal
(law ﬁrm) collide with the interests of the other principal (client).
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21 Introduction
The economic literature on large law ﬁrms has been mostly focused on
the internal organization of the ﬁrm, namely the eﬃciency of partnership
arrangements1 and their impact on the market for lawyers.2 This litera-
ture is motivated by two empirical observations: lawyers working for large
law ﬁrms earn high wages and labor contracts can be loosely described as
operating under “up-or-out” rules.
In our paper, our main concern is to explain a third empirical observa-
tion: large law ﬁrms use hourly fees rather than contingent legal fees. There
is a vast literature on the eﬃciency of contingent legal fees3, but not much
discussion on why large law ﬁrms prefer to practice hourly fees in general. In
fact, we can say that most of the economic literature emphasizes the advan-
tages of practicing contingent legal fees and the ineﬃciencies of using hourly
fees. In part, this trend can be explained by the fact contingent fees are by
large the most common practice in litigation in the United States.4
In her work, Hadﬁeld (2000) characterizes the market for lawyers by
considering two segments: the corporate and the personal client. The per-
sonal client sphere is characterized by either solo practitioners or small law
ﬁrms (usually general practice ﬁrms, or at most slightly specialized). Most
of the work is routine (what she calls noncontested legal work) and some
litigation (usually under a regime of contingent legal fees). Lawyers in this
segment are less well established and inﬂuential in the profession, earn lower
incomes and their work is seen as lower prestige.
The corporate segment is characterized by large law ﬁrms. They hire
1Gilson and Mnookin, 1985, 1989, 1994; Carr and Mathewson, 1990; O’Flaherty and
Siow, 1995; Ferrall, 1996; Wang, 2000; Rebitzer and Taylor, 2001.
2Spurr, 1987; Rosen, 1991; Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995; Sauer, 1998.
3Schwartz and Mitchell, 1970; Danzon, 1983; Halpern and Turnbull, 1983; Lynk, 1990;
Miceli and Segerson, 1991; Thomason, 1991; Dana and Spier, 1993; Gravelle and Waterson,
1993; Miceli, 1994; Hay, 1996, 1997; Rickman, 1999; Emons, 2000; Santore and Viard,
2001; Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 2002a, 2002b.
4Contingent fees for the plaintiﬀ’s attorney are the most pervasive form of payment in
personal injury and medical malpractice litigation. In one major study, 96 % of individuals
who were plaintiﬀs in tort litigation paid their attorneys on a contingent-fee basis.
3graduates from the best law schools, usually well-connected and quite inﬂu-
ential in the profession. The work of these lawyers includes serving business
clients and engaging in complex transactions and litigation (under a regime of
high hourly fees that generates high annual incomes). This work is perceived
as high prestige.
We propose four explanations, three of them directly related to the lit-
erature on contingent legal fees and the last one fully developed in a model.
The ﬁrst explanation is that contingent legal fees are a device to solve a
liquidity constraint on the plaintiﬀ’s side (Dana and Spier, 1993). Plaintiﬀs
may not have enough assets to hire an attorney under a regime of hourly
fees. Large law ﬁrms are specialized on the corporate segment of the market
for legal services. As a consequence, the problem of a liquidity constraint is
not as relevant here as in the personal client segment.
The second explanation is driven by the thesis that contingent legal fees
aim at achieving eﬃcient risk-sharing (Dana and Spier, 1993). In the context
of personal client segment, the partnership is presumably less risk averse than
the client (due to the fact that it is easier to diversify assets for a group of
individuals -partners- than for one individual). Thus, contingent legal fees
would ensure more eﬃcient risk sharing than hourly fees because they shift
some of the risk from the client (more risk averse) to the partnership (less risk
averse). However, in the corporate segment, the client is a corporation. In
economics, a corporation is the most common example of risk neutrality (due
to the fact that shareholders can diversify their portfolio by buying and selling
shares at the stock exchange whereas partners have a binding constraint,
namely they cannot “sell” shares of the partnership). Thus, hourly fees
ensure eﬃcient risk sharing because they do not shift risk from the client
(less risk averse) to the partnership (more risk averse).
A third explanation is related to the use of contingent legal fees in class-
action litigation (Lynk, 1990). Due to the fact that large law ﬁrms tend
to specialize on the corporate segment and corporations hardly engage as
plaintiﬀs in class-action, contingent legal fees will be less frequent.
These three previous explanations rely on relating the economic litera-
ture on contingent legal fees with some of the observations concerning large
law ﬁrms by Hadﬁeld (2000). Nevertheless, our paper presents a fourth
4explanation based on a moral hazard problem. Moral hazard and adverse
selection (including signaling and screening) explanations of contingent le-
gal fees (Schwartz and Mitchell, 1970; Danzon, 1983; Halpern and Turnbull,
1983; Dana and Spier, 1993; Gravelle and Waterson, 1993; Rubinfeld and
Scotchmer, 1993; Hay, 1996; Emons, 2000; Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 2002a)
have stressed that the need to align the interests of the lawyer (the agent)
with those of the client (the principal). In our model, the lawyer is an agent
of the client and of the partnership. Contingent legal fees align the interests
of the lawyer with those of the client, but not necessarily with those of the
partnership.
In our model, we have a problem of moral hazard with multiple princi-
pals with conﬂictive interests. We do not focus our explanation on adverse
selection. Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor (1996) show that large law ﬁrms
have an adverse selection problem in the determination of work hours. The
promotion to partner of the associate who have a higher propensity to work
hard and relying on the number of work hours as good measure of perfor-
mance leads to an equilibrium in which associates work too many hours. In
order to concentrate on the choice of legal fees rather than the determination
of work hours, we will consider the case where the lawyer is already a partner
and has passed the tournament stage.
In section two, we develop the model and present the conditions under
which the partnership prefers a contingent legal fees regime to hourly fees
arrangement. In section three, we provide further analysis by relaxing some
assumptions, and section four concludes the paper with ﬁnal remarks.
2 Model
There are three players, all assumed to be risk neutral: Attorney (A), Plaintiﬀ
(P) and Law Firm (L). The plaintiﬀ has been a victim of an accident or
contract breach, and wants to sue an injurer (the defendant) and be paid
compensatory or expectation damages J which is common knowledge. The
probability of winning is p and depends on the eﬀort exerted by the attorney.
The attorney works h hours on the case. These work hours can be of
5low quality h1 or of high quality h2. A high quality hour increases more the
probability of winning than a low quality hour. Thus, we assume p1 > 0,
p2 > 0, p11 < 0, p22 < 0, p12 < 0, and p2 > p1 for h1 = h2, where subscript 1
refers to low quality hours and subscript 2 refers to high quality hours.
The opportunity cost of the attorney is given by µ1h1 + µ2h2, where
µ1 < µ2. High quality hours are more costly than low quality hours for the
attorney.
The attorney is assumed to be a partner of the law ﬁrm.5 The part-
nership has an opportunity cost given by ´1h1 + ´2h2, where ´1 < ´2. The
opportunity cost of the partnership refers to the use of resources available to
all attorneys working for the ﬁrm, e.g. junior staﬀ, paralegals, secretaries,
research assistants, computers, oﬃce material, etc.
Let us deﬁne S as the amount of money the plaintiﬀ pays. The payoﬀs
for the plaintiﬀ, partner and partnership are respectively:
V
p = p(h1;h2)J ¡ S
V
a = S ¡ µ1h1 ¡ µ2h2
V
l = V
a ¡ ´1h1 ¡ ´2h2
= S ¡ (µ1 + ´1)h1 ¡ (µ2 + ´2)h2
The timing of the game is:
(1) L decides on the policy of the partnership concerning fees.
(2) P hires A. A contract speciﬁes S, h1, and h2 if contractible.
(3) A decides h1 and h2 (either conﬁrms or defects from the contract with
P).
(4) The case is either won or lost, P pays A.
5By assuming that the tournament for partnership is not an issue, we do not engage in
the discussion about the choice of performance measures (i.e., number of cases won and the
number of work hours) and the distortions on incentives that may arise as a consequence.
See Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor (1996).
62.1 Eﬃcient Contract
The eﬃcient contract is determined by maximizing the joint surplus of all
players:
pj = (µj + ´j)=J j = 1;2 (1)
Assuming that the market for lawyers is competitive (so that the partic-







2.2 Contract with Moral Hazard
Suppose the number of low and high quality hours to work is not observable
and contractible. The plaintiﬀ and the law ﬁrm can only observe and contract
on the total number of hours h and on the outcome of the case (win or lose).
Thus, the eﬃcient contract is not sustainable due to the opportunism of the
attorney.
2.2.1 Hourly Fees
Let us assume hourly fees (hereafter, HF). The plaintiﬀ pays w per hour and
chooses the number of hours to be assigned to the case. The payoﬀs are:
V
p = p(h1;h2)J ¡ w(h1 + h2)
V
a = w(h1 + h2) ¡ µ1h1 ¡ µ2h2
V
l = w(h1 + h2) ¡ (µ1 + ´1)h1 ¡ (µ2 + ´2)h2
6We will relax this assumption later and see how much our results change. As Hadﬁeld
(2000) argues, one of the problems with the market for lawyers is that it is very much
noncompetitive.
7The attorney chooses zero high quality hours (since they are more ex-
pensive and generate the same gain as low quality) and the number of low
quality hours equals the amount of hours chosen by the plaintiﬀ, say h. Thus,
payoﬀs are:
V
p = p(h;0)J ¡ wh
V
a = (w ¡ µ1)h
V
l = (w ¡ µ1 ¡ ´1)h
The attorney will only accept the case if the hourly fee w is at least µ1.
The payoﬀ for the plaintiﬀ is:
V
p = p(h;0)J ¡ µ1h
The number of hours chosen by the plaintiﬀ is ˆ h such that p1J = µ1.
It is clear that ˆ h > h¤
1 because (a) the marginal cost for the partnership
is ignored and (b) there are zero high quality hours. In summary, under a
regime of hourly fees, ˆ h1 = ˆ h > h¤
1 and ˆ h2 = 0 < h¤
2.
2.2.2 Contingent Fees
Let us consider contingent fees (hereafter, CF) now. The plaintiﬀ pays a
fraction ® of compensatory damages J if the case is won. The attorney
chooses low and high quality hours assigned to the case since they are not
contractible.
V
p = (1 ¡ ®)p(h1;h2)J
V
a = ®p(h1;h2)J ¡ µ1h1 ¡ µ2h2
V
l = ®p(h1;h2)J ¡ (µ1 + ´1)h1 ¡ (µ2 + ´2)h2
8The attorney chooses low and high quality hours such that:
®pj = µj=J j = 1;2 (3)
Given the binding participation constraint for the attorney, the contin-
gent fee ® has a lower bound, say ¯ ®(µ1;µ2;J). The plaintiﬀ chooses ® to
maximize V p subject to ® ¸ ¯ ®. The lower bound is more likely to be binding
when the marginal costs are higher or when compensatory damages are low.
The contingent fee that maximizes the payoﬀ of the plaintiﬀ is:
V
p
® = ¡pJ + p1Jh1® + p2Jh2®
= ¡pJ + µ1=®h1® + µ2=®h2® = 0
Thus, we can re-write the ﬁrst-order condition as:
® = (µ1h1® + µ2h2®)=(pJ) (4)
Thus, the optimal choice by the plaintiﬀ is given by (4) if ® ¸ ¯ ®, and is ¯ ®
otherwise. It is easily shown that hCF
1 < ˆ h1 and hCF
2 > ˆ h2 = 0.
2.3 The Law Firm Chooses HF or CF
Given the choices of the plaintiﬀ and of the attorney, the law ﬁrm announces
the policy of the partnership concerning fees. Hourly fees are preferred to
contingent fees if the following condition is satisﬁed:




2 )J ¡ (µ1 + ´1)h
CF
1 ¡ (µ2 + ´2)h
CF
2 (5)
Let us start by considering the situation where the participation con-
straint is binding in both case, hourly fees and contingent fees. The condition
for choosing hourly fees can be simpliﬁed and becomes:
´1ˆ h < ´1h
CF





2 ¸ ˆ h, then the law ﬁrm will always prefer hourly fees. If
contingent legal fees imply too many work hours from the viewpoint of the
9partnership, a regime of hourly fees will be chosen. The only situation where
contingent fees would be preferred is if by using them there is a suﬃciently
big reduction in low quality hours that more than compensates for the extra
cost of high quality hours.
It is also intuitive that hourly fees will be more likely to be preferred
if ´2=´1 is signiﬁcantly greater than µ2=µ1, i.e., if high quality hours are
relatively more expensive than low quality hours for the partnership than for
the attorney.
Suppose now that the participation constraint is not binding in the case
of contingent fees (it is necessarily binding in the case of hourly fees due to
the assumption of a competitive market for lawyers). We are back to (5).
Under these circumstances, the results are not so straightforward and in fact
it is less likely that the law ﬁrm will prefer hourly fees. The rationale is of
course that contingent fees generate more revenues. Thus, hourly fees will
be preferred if and only if the cost is much lower than under contingent fees.
2.4 What Happens if the Market for Lawyers in not
Competitive?
If the market for lawyers is not competitive, it could be that the participation
constraint is not binding for the attorney. We may consider the case where
attorneys are scarce and plaintiﬀs compete for lawyers. In other words, the
participation constraint is binding for the plaintiﬀ and not for the lawyer.
In the case of hourly fees, the choice of hours by the plaintiﬀ is p1J = w
and the hourly fee is such that w = p(ˆ h;0)J=ˆ h. It is easy to see that in
this case w > µ1 (because the participation constraint is not binding for the
attorney) and so the choice of ˆ h is lower than previously.
In the case of contingent fees, the plaintiﬀ will oﬀer ® = 1 because
of competition for lawyers. As a consequence, the choice of hours by the
attorney satisﬁes pjJ = µj for both j = 1;2. In comparison to previous
results, there will be more low and high quality hours, hCF
1 and hCF
2 .
Given the choices of the plaintiﬀ and of the attorney, the law ﬁrm an-
10nounces the policy of the partnership concerning fees. Hourly fees are pre-
ferred to contingent fees if the following condition is satisﬁed:
When the market for lawyers is not competitive, the results are not as
neat as before. On one hand, contingent fees generate higher expected com-
pensatory damages to be collected (the moral hazard problem is mitigated).
At the same time, marginal costs are higher under contingent fees. In fact, we
can calculate a critical level ¯ J above which contingent fees will be preferred,
where:
¯ J = [(µ1 + ´1)(h
CF






2 ) ¡ p(ˆ h;0))
It is quite intuitive to observe that ¯ J will be higher (it is less likely
that contingent fees will be preferred) if ´2 (cost of high quality hours for
the partnership) is higher relatively to ´1 (cost of low quality hours for the
partnership).
2.5 The Plaintiﬀ Prefers HF or CF?
If the participation constraint is binding for the plaintiﬀ, she gets her reser-
vation utility (normalized to zero) in both regimes. Hence, she is indiﬀerent.
However, if the participation constraint is binding for the attorney (and not
for the plaintiﬀ), hourly fees are preferred to contingent fees if the following
condition is satisﬁed:





If the plaintiﬀ could sell the case to the lawyer, contingent fees would
always be preferred since both are risk neutral and the agent (the lawyer)
would become the residual claimant. However, because the lawyer cannot
buy the case (a consequence of the champerty doctrine), contingent fees do
not solve completely the moral hazard problem.7
7A similar results would apply if plaintiﬀ and attorney use the modiﬁed contingent fee
system proposed by Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2002a, 2002b).
11The preference of the plaintiﬀ over the regime of legal fees will depend
on two eﬀects: (a) how much the use of contingent legal fees increases the
probability of prevailing and collecting J (i.e., how much the moral hazard
problem is in fact mitigated by contingent fees) and (b) how much more
expensive is the use of contingent legal fees for the plaintiﬀ (i.e., how large
the attorney’s share of the damages to be collected is). We can calculate a








If ® is greater than ®, mitigating the moral hazard problem is too costly
for the plaintiﬀ and she prefers hourly fees.
3 Further Analysis
In the previous version of the model, we have assumed that the partnership
has a policy of allocating to each partner the gains from the case they take.
However, in some large law ﬁrms, partners get a fraction of these gains, a
fraction that usually corresponds to the share each partner has in the part-
nership. Let us assume that each partner has a fraction ¸ of the partnership.
The payoﬀ for the partner is given by:
V
a = ¸(S ¡ ´1h1 ¡ ´2h2) ¡ µ1h1 ¡ µ2h2
The payoﬀs for the plaintiﬀ and for the partnership are the same as
before.
3.1 Contract with Moral Hazard
The eﬃcient contract is the same since the joint surplus is the same. Diﬀerent
rules of allocation of proﬁts are just redistribution of the eﬃcient surplus.
123.1.1 Hourly Fees
The attorney chooses zero high quality hours and the number of low quality
hours equals the amount of hours chosen by the plaintiﬀ, h. Thus, payoﬀs
are:
V
p = p(h;0)J ¡ wh
V
a = [¸(w ¡ ´1) ¡ µ1]h
V
l = (w ¡ µ1 ¡ ´1)h
The attorney will only accept the case if the hourly fee w is at least
´1 + µ1=¸. The payoﬀ for the plaintiﬀ is:
V
p = p(h;0)J ¡ (´1 + µ1=¸)h
The number of hours chosen by the plaintiﬀ is ˆ h such that p1J = (´1 +
µ1=¸), where ˆ h is increasing in ¸.
When ¸ = 1, the choice of hours ˆ h > h¤
1 because, even though the
plaintiﬀ’s marginal cost equals the social marginal cost, the number of high
quality hours is zero (low and high quality hours are imperfect substitutes).
However, when ¸ < 1, the plaintiﬀ’s marginal cost is superior to the social
marginal cost. Thus, unlike in the previous section, it is not clear that ˆ h > h¤
1
(i.e., the number of hours chosen by the plaintiﬀ is more than the number of
eﬃcient low quality hours). The reason for that is the marginal cost for the
plaintiﬀ being higher than that for partnership (because the attorney does
not get the full product of her work, but only a fraction ¸).
In summary, under a regime of hourly fees, ˆ h1 = ˆ h 6= h¤
1 and ˆ h2 = 0 < h¤
2.
3.1.2 Contingent Fees
Let us consider contingent fees. Expected payoﬀs are:
V
p = (1 ¡ ®)p(h1;h2)J
13V
a = ¸[®p(h1;h2)J ¡ ´1h1 ¡ ´2h2] ¡ µ1h1 ¡ µ2h2
V
l = ®p(h1;h2)J ¡ (µ1 + ´1)h1 ¡ (µ2 + ´2)h2
The attorney chooses low and high quality hours such that:
¸®pj = µj=J + ¸´j=J j = 1;2 (6)
From (6), as ¸ (attorney’s share of the partnership) increases, both hCF
1
and hCF
2 increase due to the fact that the marginal expected revenue from
the lawsuit increases.
Given the binding participation constraint for the attorney, the contin-
gent fee ® has a lower bound. Abusing of notation, let us say the lower
bound is ¯ ®(µ1;µ2;´1;´2;J;¸). As before, the plaintiﬀ chooses ® to maximize
V p subject to ® ¸ ¯ ®. Notice that the lower bound is more likely to be bind-
ing when ¸ is lower due to the fact that the attorney as a lower percentage
of the expected revenues generated by the lawsuit (and thus requires higher
legal fees).
The contingent fee that maximizes the payoﬀ of the plaintiﬀ is:
V
p



















The optimal choice by the plaintiﬀ is given by (7) if ® ¸ ¯ ®, and is ¯ ®
otherwise. As before, it is easily shown that hCF
1 < ˆ h1 and hCF
2 > ˆ h2 = 0.
143.2 The Law Firm Chooses HF or CF
As before, hourly fees are preferred to contingent fees if (5) is satisﬁed. We
have just seen that there is a negative relationship between ® and ¸ under
a regime of contingent fees. In order to have the adequate incentive, an
attorney with a small share of the partnership needs a larger legal fee. Thus,
in terms of the partnership, the expected revenues are higher. Hence, it is
less likely that hourly fees will be preferred.
Our model predicts that law ﬁrms that allocate revenues to each partner
according to the gains of the cases they take rather than according to their
share of the partnership are more likely to practice hourly fees. Whereas in
the ﬁrst case, the attorney ignores the opportunity costs of using common
resources, in the second case, these costs are somehow internalized.
4 Final Remarks
In this paper we have presented an explanations for why large law ﬁrms prefer
hourly fees rather than contingent legal fees. Under a regime of contingent
legal fees, attorneys may work too much and invest too many resources into
the case from the viewpoint of the law ﬁrm. The opportunity cost of using
common resources (e.g., paralegals, secretaries, oﬃce materials) is not fully
taken into account by attorneys thus leading to too much being spent from
the viewpoint of the partnership. As a consequence, hourly fees may provide
a solution to this problem.
Our model also predicts that law ﬁrms that allocate revenues to each
partner according to the gains of the cases they take rather than according
to their share of the partnership are more likely to practice hourly fees.
The rationale is that attorneys that are paid according to their share of the
partnership internalize better (even though not fully) the opportunity cost
of using common resources.
Given the preference of large law ﬁrms for hourly fees, one could inves-
tigate how that aﬀects the likelihood of a settlement. However, there is a
15controversy concerning the eﬀect of contingent legal fees on settlement rates
(Thomason, 1991; Miceli, 1994; Hay, 1997; Rickman, 1999; Polinsky and
Rubinfeld, 2002b). As a consequence, we cannot say that given the choice
of legal fees regime, there is a higher or a lower likelihood of a settlement in
personal litigation than in corporate litigation.
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